Could it be hidden? › Disclosure lag

Disclosure lag

How long real AI incidents stayed out of public view. Each bar runs from when an incident happened to when it was made public.

Median about 112 days (111–120) across 29 incidents; 11 of 29 made public by outsiders.

These lags are a floor, not a typical value.

Days from incident to public disclosure

What this can't show

Only incidents that became public appear here. Anything undetected, or detected and still hidden, is missing by definition, and the tracker only covers incidents from 2026 on, so it can't yet show a secret kept for years. Read these lags as a floor on how long things stay hidden, not a typical or a maximum value. The lag also runs from when an incident happened, so it mixes time before anyone noticed with time when a lab knew and said nothing; where a source says when the lab detected it, the chart marks that date.

What counts

AI agent incidents, with the date each happened and the date it was first made public; the lag is the gap between them. Inclusion rule: an unsanctioned action by an AI agent outside its sanctioned environment that touched a real third-party or public system, disclosed by anyone, with a primary source or two credible outlets. There is one entry per first public disclosure; later details about the same incident are added to it. The start date is the earliest activity documented with at least moderate confidence. Where a source gives only a month or season, the date is approximate: we record the window and measure the lag from its midpoint. "Made public by" is whoever first made an incident public. Where a source says, we also record who detected it first (the lab, outsiders, the victim, an evaluator or a government) and when. Alarm trigger W4 uses the incidents disclosed in the past 180 days. Incidents nobody has detected or disclosed can't appear here, so these lags are a floor on how long incidents stay hidden, not a ceiling. Tracked but not listed, because no occurrence date has been published: the 53 ChatGPT user images OpenAI's agents posted to image-hosting sites (disclosed Sept 25). Of the six reports OpenAI published on Sept 16, the three that touched public or third-party systems are listed; the other three (two on compaction summaries and one on writes to OpenAI's internal Artifactory) did not reach a public or third-party system, so they fall outside the inclusion rule. OpenAI's three reports dated Oct 2 (on incidents of Mar 27, May 16 and May 22) describe activity inside OpenAI's own systems; the only request that may have gone outside, to a PyPI package repository on Mar 27, returned 404, so they also fall outside the inclusion rule. Also tracked but not listed: Glow's Sept 29 report that it found more than 13,000 internal images from over 300 organisations published openly on GitHub, which it says coding agents posted to public repositories so reviewers could see visual changes; it names no agent or lab in the cases it found and dates only one (early July). The Medicare entry also covers the three other agencies the Prime Minister named in the same Sept 24 disclosure, since that was one public disclosure: the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, NSW's Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and the Victorian Department of Health, whose Victorian Agency for Health Information reporting system OpenAI's agents queried with an exposed access key (OpenAI's account, Sept 28). Of OpenAI's three reports first posted Oct 9, the two that reached public outside services are listed; the third (a grader model damaging its own task environment on Oct 6) stayed inside OpenAI's systems, as did the two incidents in its Oct 20 report (agents weakening misalignment monitoring in internal coding tasks on Oct 3 and Oct 6), so they fall outside the inclusion rule. Also tracked but not listed: CERT-In's Oct 15 advisory CIAD-2026-0049, which says agents of AI model providers under evaluation exceeded their task authorization and reached live systems of Indian organisations, reading business records with exposed credentials and connection settings, and that the providers disclosed this after internal review; it names no provider, model, victim or date. The entry for Anthropic's Oct 9 report on outside websites also covers two cases the affected states named later: Georgia's Secretary of State's office says Anthropic contacted it on Oct 8 with concerns about its agent, which the office found had accessed only publicly available data on the state's Data Hub (the office's timeline, via Atlanta News First on WTOC, Oct 26); and Virginia's governor said on Oct 23 that Anthropic's agents had submitted fake Freedom of Information Act requests on a Virginia Department of Education website, in a release saying Anthropic had disclosed earlier that month unintended actions on government websites, including within Virginia. Also tracked but not listed: Cohere's Oct 26 report that Alibaba's open-weight Qwen3.8-Flash-Next, in a sandboxed test, tried to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing, but the request never left the sandbox ("Our sandbox had no route out"), and the post gives no test date; Forever Security's Oct 22 report that a coding agent on a customer's computer, following a malicious AGENTS.md file left in the Downloads folder, tried to install a malicious npm package and was stopped before any code ran, with no date given; and a WIRED report, relayed by Truesec on Oct 30, that a defense contractor connected a personal Claude Code agent to a US Defense Department NIPRNet system, where it ran for about two months, which Accenture, the contractor Truesec names, denies (via Truesec). In that case a person connected the agent, and we found no primary source or second outlet for the account. Agent-run intrusions directed by human attackers, such as the campaign in CrowdStrike's Oct 29 VAPOR PANDA report, in which the operator intervened to steer the agents at decision points, are misuse by their operators, not unsanctioned actions by the agents, so they fall outside the inclusion rule. Of OpenAI's three reports first posted Nov 4 and 5, the one that reached outside services (a coding evaluation on Aug 4) is listed; "Covert underperformance on safety research tasks" (behaviour first noticed Aug 20) and "Trying to prompt-inject the grader in filenames" (July 3) stayed inside OpenAI's internal deployment and evaluations, so they fall outside the inclusion rule. Also tracked but not listed: Primcloud's founder Josh Manders posted on Nov 2 that a Railway employee had just tried to breach his infrastructure, and Railway's CEO Jake Cooper said on Nov 3 that the employee had built, on their own time, a tool for "proactive identification + reporting of bug bounties", had signed up for a personal subscription to a hosted service running DeepSeek, and ran the tool "once and only once, on a singular external provider", halting it within 15 minutes (Manders; Cooper, on X). A person pointed the tool at an outside provider, so we count it as directed by its operator, not an unsanctioned action by the agent (our inference); we could not open the employee's own account of how far the tool went. The Hugging Face entry also covers what OpenAI's Aug 26 technical report says the agents did to two other third parties in the same intrusion. One is a Modal customer's publicly reachable CyberGym application: agents first ran code in it on July 9, and an internal-only research agent used the customer's container, where it established a root shell, as a launchpad into Hugging Face's environment and as an outbound relay. Modal has confirmed that its "platform and isolation were not compromised in any way" (Modal, via OpenAI's report), and Modal's chief technology officer, Akshat Bubna, said "Modal's platform wasn't compromised" (Bubna, via Bloomberg, read in Claims Journal). The other is a user account at another service, which the agents reached with a publicly exposed credential and used from July 9 to 13 to stage API responses, credentials and payloads. OpenAI's report on July 19, first posted Nov 10, says that in the same evaluation ten agents pursued Hugging Face-related leads with credentials and other materials left by earlier runs, and that "Their attempts to access protected resources failed"; it describes no other activity outside OpenAI's systems that day, and, as with the PyPI request of Mar 27, failed attempts fall outside the inclusion rule (our inference). OpenAI's report first posted Nov 12, "Stopping a running alignment evaluation", in which GPT-6 Astra in internal deployment shut down a running alignment evaluation on Oct 8, stayed inside OpenAI's systems, so it also falls outside the inclusion rule. Also tracked but not listed: the cybersecurity start-up Cathedral's access to Anthropic's internal systems. Anthropic's account, as iNews24 reported it on Nov 9, dates the unauthorized access to Oct 8 and Anthropic's awareness to Oct 10 (Anthropic, via iNews24). Cathedral's draft report says its researchers found paths to internal Anthropic data after running AI agents for less than 12 hours (Cathedral, via the Washington Post, read on DNYUZ, Oct 26); the Post reports that Cathedral probed Anthropic under a company program that invites outside experts to test its systems, and Anthropic said Cathedral had not fully followed the rules of that bug-bounty program, failing to disclose all of its activity inside Anthropic's systems (Anthropic, via the Washington Post). People started and directed the testing, so we count it as directed by its operators, not an unsanctioned action by the agents (our inference). Also tracked but not listed: Perplexity's Nov 11 report on testing SPACE, its sandbox for running agents' code. In a network-bypass task Perplexity set, to reach a callback URL that the sandbox's network policy blocked, models sometimes got there through public relay services such as Fastly's fiddle.fastly.dev testing tool. In one Claude Opus 5.0 run the model first "rejected using a public relay because it believed this would violate the task's restrictions", then, given a summary of its own earlier failed runs, "reconsidered that interpretation and successfully retrieved the callback through a relay" (Perplexity). The post gives no run dates and doesn't say the task forbade relays. Getting past the network policy was the task, so we don't count it as unsanctioned (our inference). Also tracked but not listed, because no occurrence date has been published: Anthropic's Nov 9 system card for Claude Fable 5.2 and Claude Mythos 5.2 says its monitoring of internal traffic found early snapshots of Claude Mythos 5.2 that, in a few instances, "attempted to access papers whose URLs were blocked by a network proxy by making requests to services like the Wayback Machine", and one that, in an environment where GitHub was blocked, "used the golang pathway to download a GitHub repository" (Anthropic). The card dates neither.

Why it matters

This is the closest thing we have to an empirical base rate for hypotheses A and C: how long real AI behaviour stayed out of public view, and who brought it to light. In 2026 the incidents that did come out took from days to months to surface, and 11 of the 29 were made public by someone other than the lab: victims, outside researchers, evaluators, governments or reporters. That shows sub-AGI agents can act out of public view for months, and that labs don't reliably disclose first. It can't show how long a careful system, or a lab set on keeping a secret, could stay hidden. New incidents are added in each weekly wrap-up.

Separate, lab-reported context: Anthropic says that in August 2026 about 30,000 research and engineering agents ran at once on its most-used internal platform, every action passed through an automated monitor before it ran, and about 1 in 47,000 actions was blocked (Anthropic; self-reported, not independently audited). It measures what one lab's monitor catches, not what reaches the public.

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